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Abstract 
The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility 
completed a second neptunium oxide production 
campaign in which nine (9) additional cans of 
neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to 
the Idaho National Laboratory and Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping 
container. These additional cans were from a 
different feed solution than the first fifty (50) 
cans of neptunium oxide that were previously 
produced and shipped via a Letter of 
Amendment to the 9975 Safety Analysis Report 
for Packaging (SARP) content table. This paper 
will address the challenges associated with 
demonstrating the neptunium oxide produced 
from the additional feed solution was equivalent 
to the original neptunium oxide and within the 
content description of the Letter of Amendment.  
 
Introduction 
Neptunium-237 oxide is used for the production 
of plutonium-238 to support NASA space 
missions.  Previous chemical processing at the 
Savannah River Site (SRS) H-Canyon Facility 
during the 1970s and 1980s produced neptunium 
solutions.  These solutions were stored in a H-
Canyon tank until 2003 when the decision was 
made to stabilize the solutions into neptunium-
237 oxide to support future plutonium-238 
production.  Processing the solutions into 
neptunium oxide would be performed in the HB-
Line Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS). 
 
The HB-Line Facility completed a campaign in 
which a total of fifty nine (59) cans of neptunium 
oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho 
National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) in the 9975 
shipping container.  The shipping campaign 
involved the addition of neptunium oxide to the 
Model 9975 B(M)F-85 Safety Analysis Report 
for Packaging (9975 SARP) as a new content 
and then a Letter of Amendment to the 9975 
SARP content table.  The first fifty (50) cans of 
neptunium oxide was produced from H-Canyon 
Tank 8.5 solution (referred to as Neptunium Part 
1).  Shipment of Neptunium Part 1 material is 
addressed in ASME Paper “Packaging and 
Transportation of Neptunium Oxide” by the 
authors.   
 
The remaining nine (9) cans of neptunium oxide 
were produced from H-Canyon Tank 16.4, 11.7, 
12.5, and 9.6 (referred to as Neptunium Part 2) 
after all of the Part 1 solution was converted to 
oxide. These additional cans were from a 
different feed solution than the original fifty (50) 
cans of neptunium oxide that were previously 
produced and shipped via a Letter of 
Amendment to the 9975 Safety Analysis Report 
for Packaging (SARP) content table.  Eight of 
the Neptunium Part 2 oxide cans were shipped to 
INL and one Neptunium Part 2 oxide can was 
shipped to ORNL under the same SARP Letter 
of Amendment that authorized the shipment of 
the Neptunium Part 1 material.   
 
 
Neptunium Oxide Process 
Neptunium nitrate solution from the H-Canyon 
Facility was transferred to the HB-Line Facility 
were it was concentrated, purified, and then 
converted to an oxide powder.  The H-Canyon 
feed material was approximately 13 g/l 
neptunium.  Ferrous sulfamate was added to the 
neptunium feed to ensure the neptunium valence 
was adjusted to +4.  After adjusting the molarity, 
the solution was transferred to an anion-
exchange resin column.  Approximately 2000 g 
of neptunium was loaded on the anion column 
per batch.  The anion exchange concentrated and 
purified the neptunium nitrate solution to 
approximately 50 g/l neptunium.  The neptunium 
nitrate was then heated and transferred to a 
precipitator.  Oxalic acid was added to the 
neptunium solution in a direct strike precipitation 
process.  The precipitant was collected on a 
screen in a “filter boat”.  The neptunium oxalate 
precipitant was calcined in a furnace to form 
neptunium oxide powder.  The oxalate was 
heated above 635ºC for 3 hours in air to form 
approximately 1200 g of neptunium oxide per 
filter boat.  The neptunium oxide was packaged 
in sealed product cans, with approximately 6 kg 
neptunium per can, which were loaded into a 
9975 shipping container for shipment from SRS 
to INL and ORNL 
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Unlike the Part 1 solution from Tank 8.5, which 
was primarily pure neptunium solution with 
some plutonium and trace amounts of non-
radioactive impurities, the Part 2 solution was a 
collection of solutions from various tanks that 
contained low concentrations of plutonium and 
uranium solutions with neptunium.  Prior to HB-
Line receiving the Part 2 solution, the contents 
were processed by the H-Canyon solvent 
extraction process to "clean-up" the neptunium 
solution for the purpose of making the solution 
resemble the Part 1 solution.  The processing 
removed most of the unwanted constituents 
(plutonium, thorium, cerium, and some non-
radioactive impurities) and yielded a "clean" 
neptunium solution.  To reduce the possibility 
that the solution would become contaminated by 
tank heels and process piping as it is moved 
through the H-Canyon to the HB-Line feed tank, 
a flush program was implemented by H-Canyon.   
 
The Part 2 solution was processed in HB-Line 
using a similar flow sheet as the Part 1 solution.  
The only change was that additional anion-
exchange column washes were implemented to 
remove the large amounts of uranium that could 
not be removed by H-Canyon which would carry 
over into the neptunium oxide product.  
Although the additional column washes were 
necessary to avoid a neptunium oxide product 
with a low neptunium assay which could not be 
reprocessed or shipped, the washes did result in 
the lose of some neptunium resulting in less cans 
of neptunium oxide.   
 
9975 SARP Letter of Amendment 
The Letter of Amendment to the 9975 SARP 
established neptunium content criteria which 
would be safe to ship in a 9975 shipping 
container and could be achieved by the HB-Line 
Facility.  The 9975 SARP Letter of Amendment 
defined in detail specific limits for radioactive 
material, non-radioactive impurities, moisture, 
and physical characteristics.  
 
For the shipment of any actinide material in 
oxide form, such as neptunium oxide, gas 
generation must be addressed.  The primary 
parameters associated with gas generation of the 
neptunium oxide product are moisture content 
and total alpha dose (or activity).  Gas generation 
testing of plutonium oxide has shown that 
specific surface area (SSA) and moisture content 
are two important factors in hydrogen (and 
oxygen) gas generation of plutonium oxide.  For 
plutonium oxide, SSA and moisture uptake 
decrease with increasing temperature used to 
calcine the material.  Neptunium oxide was 
expected to behave similarly. 
 
Prior to commencement of neptunium 
processing, a liquid sample of H-Canyon 
neptunium solution was converted to neptunium 
oxide at the Savannah River National Laboratory 
(SRNL) to determine the neptunium oxide 
hydrogen gas generation rates and provide input 
to the 9975 SARP content table. The neptunium 
oxide was produced according to the anticipated 
HB-Line flowsheet (process) consisting of anion 
exchange, oxalate precipitation, filtration, and 
calcination.  Characterization of the neptunium 
oxide product to be used in gas generation tests 
included bulk and tap density measurements, X-
ray diffraction, particle size distribution, specific 
surface area measurements, and moisture 
analysis. Temperatures of 600ºC and 650ºC were 
chosen to calcine the neptunium oxalate based on 
the expected HB-Line furnace operating 
temperature of 625ºC +/- 25ºC.   
 
The neptunium oxide Letter of Amendment to 
the 9975 SARP included new content limits for 
neptunium oxide such as specifying a moisture 
limit in terms of LOI to be less than 0.24 wt%, 
limiting the total plutonium content to no more 
than 611 ppm, limiting the total plutonium alpha 
activity to no more than 8,580 microcuries per 
gram of neptunium, and specifying only a total 
non-radioactive impurity limit.  In addition, the 
neptunium oxide had to be produced by a 
method equivalent to original neptunium oxide.  
The original neptunium oxide limits for material 
inerting, total material mass, total radioactive 
material mass, and heat generation (watts) from 
the 9975 SARP were unchanged.[1]   
 
 
Neptunium Oxide Subject Matter Expert 
Team 
For Neptunium Part 2, a Neptunium Subject 
Matter Expert (SME) Team was formed to verify 
compliance with the requirements of the 9975 
SARP Letter of Amendment.  The purpose of the 
SME Team was to establish the criteria against 
which the Neptunium Part 2 solutions and final 
product could be judged to show equivalency 
with the Neptunium Part 1 solution and final 
product in regard to the impurities and physical 
attributes of the final product. 
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The Savannah River Site (SRS) produced 
neptunium oxide from two different solution 
sources.  The Part 1 feed solution was used as 
the basis for the original neptunium oxide 
content evaluations which were incorporated into 
the 9975 SARP.  This evaluation included gas 
generation testing on laboratory produced 
neptunium oxide from the Part 1 solution.  A 
Letter of Amendment to the 9975 SARP was 
written after process upsets prevented the 
processing facility from meeting the original 
content requirements as specified in the SARP.  
The basis for the Letter of Amendment was the 
determination of the parameters which were key 
to gas generation.  These were moisture content, 
alpha activity, and material purity.  Also 
included in this Letter of Amendment was 
justification to allow the neptunium oxide 
product produced from the Part 2 feed solution to 
be shipped in a 9975, provided this product 
could be shown equivalent to the Part 1 
neptunium oxide product.  
 
Since gas generation testing could not be 
performed for the neptunium oxide from the Part 
2 solution, a Neptunium SME Team was 
established to determine what parameters the 
Part 2 solution and oxide product had to meet.  
To answer this question the Neptunium SME 
Team determined the composition of the Part 1 
material at three stages:  the initial solution, the 
in-process solution, and the final neptunium 
oxide product.  From these compositions the 
Neptunium SME Team established the criteria 
by which the Part 2 material would be compared 
to the Part 1 material.  Trigger limits for 
impurities were established for each stage.  Any 
impurity above the specified trigger limit had to 
be evaluated by the Neptunium SME Team.  
Provided the Part 2 material final neptunium 
oxide product compared favorably to the 
neptunium oxide product from the Part 1 
material it was deemed by the Neptunium SME 
Team to be bounded by the gas generation 
testing of the Part 1 product which satisfied one 
of the Letter of Amendment conditions for 
shipment.  
 
The initial solution and in-process solution 
comparisons were done to ensure that any 
impurities which would affect the final 
neptunium oxide product were removed since 
reprocessing the oxide was not an option.  As 
expected, the initial solution had significant 
levels of uranium which confirmed the need for 
additional anion-exchange column washes to 
remove the uranium which would carry over 
with neptunium oxide and yield an undesirable 
product.  The other elements that exceeded the 
initial solution trigger limits were iron, sodium, 
chromium, and nickel.  The SME Team 
concluded that these elements would be removed 
by the HB-Line process and not significantly 
impact the neptunium oxide product.  The in-
process solution results showed reduced levels of 
uranium, sodium, and iron which were well 
within the SME trigger limits.  Chromium and 
nickel still remained above the SME trigger 
limits along with cerium and magnesium.  The 
SME Team anticipated some carry over of these 
elements into the final oxide product; however, 
small changes in the concentration of these 
metals were not expected to cause a significant 
change in hydrogen generation rate of the 
neptunium oxide product.  
 
The Neptunium SME reviews of the final oxide 
product primarily focused on product purity, 
alpha activity, moisture content, and impurity 
results verses the trigger limits.  This review was 
conducted for each of the neptunium oxide cans 
produced from the Part 2 feed solution.  
Although some of the neptunium oxide product 
cans produced from the Part 2 feed solution did 
occasionally exceed the impurity trigger limits, 
all of the cans were deemed within the original 
gas generation testing and acceptable for 
shipment.  When an impurity trigger limit was 
exceeded the Neptunium SME Team evaluated 
the neptunium oxide product against the 
following questions: 
• What was the impurity that exceeded the 
trigger limit? 
• How much above the trigger limit was the 
impurity result? 
• Is there an increasing or decreasing trend for 
the impurity results? 
• What effect does the impurity have on gas 
generation? 
• What was the neptunium assay (purity)? 
• What was the alpha activity? 
• What was the moisture content (level)? 
 
All nine of the Neptunium Part 2 cans had very 
favorable results for moisture, alpha activity, and 
neptunium assay.  However, all nine neptunium 
oxide cans had at least one impurity result that 
exceeded the trigger limit.  Cerium consistently 
exceeded the trigger limit as expected since 
cerium was above the trigger limit in the in-
process solution.  In an oxalate precipitation 
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process cerium converts to cerium oxide, during 
furnace conversion.  Because cerium oxide is a 
refractory oxide the SME Team did not expect it 
to cause a significant change in hydrogen 
generation of the neptunium Part 2 oxide.  The 
trigger limits for cadmium and lithium were 
exceeded slightly only once for different 
neptunium oxide cans.  Considering the high 
neptunium assay, low moisture, and low alpha 
activity the SME Team concluded the hydrogen 
generation rate for the neptunium oxide to 
remain within the test results of the neptunium 
Part 1 oxide. 
 
The biggest challenge for the SME Team came 
from the carbon results.  The carbon results for 
the third can were slightly above the trigger 
limits.  For the next four cans the carbon results 
remained above the trigger limits but showed a 
puzzling increasing then decreasing trend.  Based 
on analysis of carbon components within the 
HB-Line process (i.e. anion resin, gaskets), it 
appeared that the carbon was not organic and 
consequently was not anticipated to change the 
hydrogen generation of this neptunium oxide 
product significantly.  However, neither the 
source nor the form of the carbon had been 
identified; therefore, the Neptunium SME Team 
developed additional lines of inquiry to 
investigate the elevated carbon in the neptunium 
oxide.  Fortunately an investigation into the 
carbon analytical protocols revealed that the site 
laboratory carbon results were biased high in 
regards to the Part 2 Neptunium Oxide.  
After answering each of these questions, the 
Neptunium SME Team concluded that the 
neptunium oxide from the Part 2 feed solution 
was equivalent to the neptunium oxide produced 
from the Part 1  feed solution campaign with 
respect to the impurities and physical attributes 
affecting gas generation. [2] 
 
Conclusion 
The Neptunium SME Team determined that the 
Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility Part 2 
Neptunium Oxide production campaign oxide 
was equivalent to the Part 1 Neptunium Oxide 
campaign with respect to impurities and physical 
attributes for hydrogen gas generation.  
Therefore, the SME Team concluded that the 
neptunium oxide meet the chemical composition 
criteria for shipment to the Idaho National 
Laboratory  and Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
per the Letter of Amendment to the 9975 SARP.  
The successful shipment of nine (9) additional 
cans of neptunium oxide marked the conclusion 
to the SRS neptunium stabilization campaign.  In 
total fifty nine (59) cans of neptunium oxide 
were produced and shipped to the Idaho National 
Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
in the 9975 shipping container.   
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